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My discussion of a politics of uncertainty is best begun with a lesson in humility. 
I had the good fortune to be on an interdisciplinary team of researchers investi-
gating the resilience of large- scale socio- technical systems: namely, the chance that 
levees and dikes would breach in the California Delta. I was the team’s policy ana-
lyst, and other team members were from backgrounds in engineering, geographic 
information systems, crisis management and the social sciences. While this was an 
important US National Science Foundation project, we had been on big research 
projects and interdisciplinary teams before.
Now, the lesson learned: it was only after a year of regular meetings that the team 
leader and I realised we were operating under very different operating definitions of 
resilience. His was the time to recovery after a levee breach, mine was the ability of 
the levee to absorb shocks before breaching. This was a sobering experience, given 
the decades of experience of those involved and the explicit project focus on resili-
ence. It is also a good example of the impact of ambiguity as outlined in the Stirling 
typology of incertitudes, discussed in the introduction to this book.
So, too, definitions of, and assumptions about, risk and uncertainty cannot be 
taken for granted in high- stakes settings across multiple disciplines. No matter 
how often we distinguish between, on the one hand, measurable risks (where 
estimates of the probability and consequences of failure exist) and, on the other 
hand, non- measurable uncertainties (where estimates of the probability or conse-
quence of failure are missing, if not unobtainable), there are those who insist that 
risk and uncertainty are not separable. Arguably the most famous example is ISO 
31000 ‘Risk management – Principles and guidelines’, which states up front: ‘risk 
[is defined as] the effect of uncertainty on objectives’. Of course, the International 





but the point of departure in uncertainty is unmistakable. So, too, for ordinary lan-
guage and its deliberate ambiguity when it comes to the terms uncertainty, risk, 
unpredictability, chance and likelihood, among others.
This chapter demonstrates that another set of distinctions is as crucial as that 
between risk, uncertainty and the unknown- unknowns of unstudied/ unstudiable 
conditions: it is equally necessary for a politics of uncertainty to distinguish between 
controlling, managing and coping with those risks, uncertainties and unstudied 
conditions. Here, too, however, ordinary language – and its lexicographers – take 
‘control’, ‘manage’ and ‘cope’ as overlapping, if not synonymous on occasion. 
I should not then be as surprised – as I usually am – that when I say ‘manage’ to an 
audience from other disciplines, they think I’m talking about control. Believe me, 
there is nothing further away from my mind at that point than illusions of control!
I come from a profession – policy analysis – that has long given up organising 
notions of Weberian hierarchies, and command and control, in favour of – the 
names speak for themselves – muddling through, garbage- can processes, adhoc-
racy, coping agencies, goal displacement with means- as- ends, bricolage and, my 
favourite, managing messes (for more on these notions, see Roe 2013). Of course, 
control can and does exist, but for policy analysts such as myself any starting 
assumption that complex systems, let alone contemporary politics and major pol-
icies, can macro- control each important micro- operation is misleading, where not 
outright dangerous.
The argument in what follows is that just as it is dangerous to close down demo-
cratic deliberations to risk only, so too is it dangerous to close down that deliber-
ation to the pros and cons of control. A politics of uncertainty recognises that a 
world where risks must always be controlled falls far short of meeting the trans-
formative challenges involved in better managing uncertainties and coping better 
with unstudied/ unstudiable conditions where control is not possible. Indeed, trans-
formation may be all about managing – or coping better – with so- called existential 
risks that cannot be controlled.
Preliminaries
This chapter’s argument is grounded in research findings on real- time per-
sonnel operating large socio- technical systems – think: critical infrastructures for 
water, energy, telecommunications and transportation (for details see Roe and 
Schulman 2016; 2008). In ways described later in the chapter, personnel must 
manage real- time operations precisely because they do not have control of the 
entire system as a system at any one time, and at the same time because coping 
passively with system- wide shocks that are outside of their direct control is also 
not an option. Instead, they must actively manage risks they cannot control, as 
well as actively manage key uncertainties so as to avoid unstudied conditions. 
Moreover, when they find themselves in unstudied conditions, they cope not 
just reactively but by planning the next step ahead. Worse behaviour for a politics 
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What do these professionals mean by control, management and coping? In 
formal terms, control is when the system’s input variance, process variance and 
output variance are rendered low and stable. Think of the nuclear reactor power 
plant:  guns, guards and gates are used to ensure outside inputs are controlled; 
processes within the nuclear station are highly regulated by government to ensure 
few or no mistakes are made (operations and procedures that have not been 
analysed beforehand are not permissible); and the output of the plant – its elec-
tricity – is kept constant, with as low variance as possible (nuclear power is often 
considered the ‘baseload’ for a system, on top of which are added other types of 
electricity generation).
The problem now and in the foreseeable future is that the number of crit-
ical infrastructures having low input variance/ low process variance/ low output 
variance are fewer and fewer because of increasing political, economic and social 
unpredictabilities affecting their service provision. Indeed, the very same political, 
economic and social turmoil has undermined older control- centred notions of 
the Frankfurt School’s ‘totally administered society’, Harold Lasswell’s ‘garrison 
state’ and Erving Goffman’s ‘total institutions’  – where key social entities were 
determined by elites (a theme that is also central to academic discussions of totali-
tarian politics and societies).
It is the case today that an increasing number of electricity generation sources – 
and very important ones – face high input variability. Deregulation (involving lib-
eralisation and privatisation) of the integrated utilities has brought with it volatile 
electricity markets and prices; and, in addition, environmental factors like the cli-
mate have become more unpredictable. Consequently, operational processes inside 
other power plants have had to become more varied (this being the so- called law 
of requisite variety (Weick 1995; Ashby 1952)), with more options and strategies to 
process and produce what still must be a low- variance output: namely, electricity at 
a regulated frequency and voltage. Coping in these systems embraces cases where 
process variance can no longer be managed to match input variance and/ or where 
output variance is no longer low and stable. Earthquakes, catastrophic fires and tsu-
namis have had just this effect with default of professional behaviour and operations 
to coping behaviour.
These initial strategies and types of ‘unpredictabilities’, as infrastructure 
operators would call them, are summarised in Table 5.1. To be clear, they are based 
on the observations of and descriptions provided by infrastructure operators in our 
research.
Why do these infrastructure distinctions matter for a politics of 
uncertainty?
The infrastructures we study, like water, energy and transportation, are mandated 
to operate in a highly reliable fashion – that is, to provide the critical service in 
question safely and continuously even during (or especially during) turbulent times. 





are politics described as being about – and are expected to be about – underwriting 
and stabilising respective services, and this too requires varieties of power.
Further, once you realise that operations in critical infrastructures and in politics 
are undertaken in the face of a host of shared uncertainties and shocks, five inter-
knitted features of infrastructures and politics take on prominence:
• First, infrastructures and politics often have the same operational/ 
administrative areas. States and cities, for example, have their own trans-
mission grids and water supplies, including respective political and regula-
tory oversight. In fact, it is difficult to imagine how modern politics could 
be undertaken without foundational infrastructures for telecommunications, 
energy and such like in place.
• Second, both infrastructures and politics centre on high stakes. 
Managing uncertainty is a matter of life and death if critical infrastructure ser-
vices fail; the often- related high stakes of politics are visible and central across 
governmental and administrative scales relying on the infrastructures.
• Third, managing uncertainty in real- time for infrastructures is an 
ever- present challenge, as it is in politics. If you cannot manage non- 
measurable uncertainties now when it matters, why would we believe your 
promises to control or cope with them better later on?
• Fourth, non- measurable uncertainties, and not just measurable risks, 
are to be managed in infrastructures and in politics. Politicians and 
TABLE 5.1 Forms of unpredictability: definitions and outcomes
Type of  
unpredictability
Definition Type of operational 
approach
Outcome
Risk Probability and 
consequences of 
failure are known 
and estimated
Control Low and stable output 
variance through keeping 
low input variance and 
low process variance
Uncertainty* Either probability 
or consequences 
of failure are 
unknown or not 
estimated
Manage High input variance 
matched by high process 
variance to ensure 
low and stable output 
variance
Unknown- unknowns Neither probability 
nor consequences 
of failure are 
known for 
estimating
Cope High and unstable 
output variance and/ 
or inadequate process 
variance to match input 
variance
* This definition, consonant with how infrastructure operators see uncertainty, is less expansive than 
‘uncertainty’ in the Stirling framework (Stirling 2010). Note also that the operator term ‘unknown- 
unknowns’ does not capture the subjective and intersubjective features conveyed by ‘ignorance’.
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reliability professionals (including their staffs) manage real- time uncertainties 
in ways that do not stand or fall on undertaking formal risk assessment or 
standard methodologies. Also, it is notable that the ‘public interests’ of large, 
critical infrastructures – ensuring system- wide safety and reliability across pol-
itical settings  – necessitate sensitivities to different types of uncertainty, and 
their respective management.
• Fifth, the inevitably major role for real- time uncertainty management 
remains under- appreciated when it comes to the craft of politics, as 
well as the craft of infrastructure operations. Some discipline- based or 
science- based experts and academics tend to dismiss the professionalism, domains 
of practice and processes for managing large socio- technical systems and politics.
You can think of real- time managers of infrastructures operating in the same way 
as those in policy- making and politics who have learned that managing a mess in 
policy and management (stopping a good mess from going bad or preventing a bad 
one from getting worse) may be far better than trying to clean that mess up once 
and for all. Why? Because attempts at achieving a ‘once and for all solution’ can and 
often do make major policy messes more difficult to manage (Roe 2013). In the field 
of critical infrastructures, you see this recognition that management is not control 
but must be more than coping reactively in the shift from the terminology of ‘con-
trol rooms’ and ‘control operators’ to, for example, ‘operations centres’ and the more 
accurate job titles of ‘dispatchers’ and ‘schedulers’. In order to avoid any confusion 
with ‘controllers’, my research colleague, Paul Schulman, and I have termed such 
infrastructure operators and their real- time support staff ‘reliability professionals’.
More detailed argument
Since ‘control’ and ‘manage’ are perceived differently, senior staff in some 
infrastructures we have researched make a big point about how risk controls 
(read: compliance) are not the whole of risk management. As one high- level risk 
manager for a large energy utility put it:
The approach we’ve taken is that compliance is the first step in risk manage-
ment. Compliance requirements that are in place are our first obligation in 
risk management. It’s the minimum that we built the rest of our enterprise 
risk management on. You can do more than just compliance. So compliance 
and risk management aren’t two separate things, where we do one and then 
the other. You do both at the same time.
For example, we do risk management with respect to compliance:  We 
determine how comfortable we are with respect to our controls for compli-
ance. What problems are there in our compliance programmes? Where do we 
stand in respect to industry standards or even better on this? (From transcript 
of an interview held on 30 March 2015, with the senior manager of a risk 




This difference between control and management of risks is graphically displayed 
in Table 5.2:
Since no existing compliance measure or preset risk control can be expected to 
be 100 per cent effective, the cell ‘Control/ Risks’ in Table 5.2 is lightly shaded and 
must be complemented by ‘Manage/ Risks’, the darker shaded cell, for risks that 
cannot be controlled in real- time or must not be assumed to be controllable right 
now, when it matters. For example, it is because tomorrow’s heat wave is uncontrol-
lable that electric and natural gas grids have to manage the added load requirements 
for, and associated risks relating to, assets and personnel.
Such management strategies for measurable risks, we found in our research, 
include having a range of subject matter experts and outside certification programmes 
and reviews for process safety management and risk management protocols – again, 
as a way of increasing process options and strategies to match an increasing input 
variance. The crux, though, is that even in managing risks, the reliability professionals 
do not rely solely on a single distribution of numbers. Numerical averages and ranges 
wobble, and this has to be compensated for by experienced and skilled reliability 
professionals.
It is not only risks that have to be managed because it is dangerous to assume 
they can be controlled: key non- measurable uncertainties must also be managed. 
Infrastructure operators typically distinguish uncertainties in terms of missing 
estimates for the probability or consequence of failure. Since the estimate of risk 
is defined as the product of the estimates of the probability and consequence of 
failure, uncertainties are cases where operators have (rough) estimates of probabil-
ities and consequences of failure, but not for both at the same time. The same 
follows when the logic of risk is cast in terms of threats, exposures and vulnerabil-
ities. Real- time infrastructure operators may have better knowledge of the prob-
ability of failure than they do of the consequences of failure; alternatively, they may 
have better knowledge of consequences than of probability.
Over and over again in our research, and to complicate our initial definition of 
‘uncertainty’ (Table 5.1), real- time operators told us they were able to manage uncer-
tainties about which they may know something more about their consequences 
than they do about their likelihoods, or vice versa. Where utilities know more about 
probabilities of failure than the expected consequences of failure, we found one 
management strategy to be planning for or preparing around worst- case scenarios 
TABLE 5.2 Primary approaches to operating for three types of unpredictabilities
Objective of operational approach
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and extra safeguards. Where more is known about the consequences of failure 
than the likelihood of failure, one management strategy (also for increasing process 
variance) is the expanded use of simulation studies and of investments in uncer-
tainty reduction with respect to the probability of failure. For example, ‘deep dives’ 
into specific cases are undertaken by experienced personnel – and not just subject 
matter specialists. The cell ‘Manage/ Uncertainties’ has a darker shade in Table 5.2, 
to reflect this primary approach.
In case it needs saying, for a world where events are sometimes uncontrollable, 
and in other cases unmanageable (i.e., process options and strategies cannot be 
increased to reflect increased input variance), there are instances where neither the 
probability nor consequences of failure are known or studiable under the demands 
of real- time urgency. (Or, if you prefer, those concerned are at a loss to deter-
mine just what are the threats, exposures and vulnerabilities.) Here is where coping 
behaviour of infrastructure operators in the face of the unknown- unknown is not-
able – but it is coping with a difference.
When real- time infrastructure operations suffer a shock that pushes those 
operations into unstudied conditions, the professionals are not only expected to 
be resilient as regards absorbing the shock, they are at the same time expected 
to be planning the next step or operation ahead. They do not want to bounce 
back to the same position that left them vulnerable:  they want to bounce for-
ward to better real- time operating conditions. This coping is coping- ahead in 
the face of real- time unknown- unknowns (darker shade in Table  5.2), since it 
involves planning above- and- beyond reactions in real- time. One such coping- 
ahead strategy that is directed to planning the next steps for real- time operations 
is the routine use of variously named ‘white hat’ teams that are internal to the 
infrastructure. These teams seek to find ways to undermine real- time system 
operations so as to anticipate more effectively – predict and prepare for – defects 
that are exploitable by system attack, intentional or otherwise. Planning ahead 
for addressing defects becomes a template – imperfect as it must be for what are 
unknown- unknowns  – when responding later on to what are encountered in 
real- time as functionally similar defects.
An emancipatory politics of uncertainty?
This chapter now shifts its register from the descriptive to the normative. The oper-
ational strategies and unpredictabilities that society’s critical infrastructures seek to 
handle better are also necessary for the successful enactment of policy. To do other-
wise, I suggest, is to open politics to more catastrophe.
Return to Table 5.2 and its highlighted cells. I ask you to see the highlighted 
cells as principal stepping- stones along a pathway for addressing unpredictabilities 
in complex, high- stakes systems and processes. (Note the accent on ‘principal’ 
leaves aside any complications arising when the empty cells in Table 5.2 are not 
empty.) I  submit that to take a politics of uncertainty seriously centres on dem-
onstrating – constantly – behaviour that recognises the need to better cope- ahead 







and risks better than they are now being managed and that recognises control of 
all this is not possible, where attempts to exert such control create grave political 
hazards instead.
This politics of uncertainty is, as such, a full- time job for those who treat the 
politics seriously. How then is it emancipatory? William Kentridge, painter and 
artist, provides an insight. To the interview question, ‘You’ve been called the patron 
saint of ambiguity. How do you feel about that?’, he responded:
How do I feel? Ambiguous: I like it and I don’t like it. I wish some things 
could be much clearer that one holds onto without any doubts. I’m wary 
of certainty, but I’m very weary of uncertainty, also (quoted in Buck 2016 [my 
italics]).
I adapt his insight – wariness of certainties (namely, the pretence to certainty that 
full control of major politics and policies is achievable) and weariness of having 
continually to manage and cope- ahead  – as the starting point for a politics of 
uncertainty. This starting point forces us then to ask:  why put up with wari-
ness and weariness? What keeps ‘us’ going? What do we get from these multiple 
unpredictabilities and having to address them in multiple ways?
For me, the wariness and weariness are associated with emancipation: emancipa-
tion from thinking there is no alternative, and emancipation from thinking complex 
policy problems are wicked and as such intractable. The world cannot be controlled 
to be only one way; it is far too complex for that, with many components, each 
component having multiple functions (I am a husband, father, blogger…), and the 
many interconnections between and among components, functions and the wider 
environments in which these are embedded enable all manner of interpretations, 
explanations and descriptions. No single reading can cover, let alone exhaust, that 
complexity.
The upshot of this inexhaustibility is that complex problems can be cast in mul-
tiple ways; or to come at it from another direction, any complex problem that has 
no description other than ‘there’s no alternative’, ‘it’s intractable’ or ‘it’s a wicked 
problem’ is an exaggeration that has closed down discussion and analysis long before 
any insights into alternative possibilities have been obtained. More, those alternative 
descriptions lie in knowing better than striving for complete control and instead 
undertaking managing and coping- ahead. Knowing that this is so and acting on the 
knowledge is, for me, the hard work of emancipating new possibilities. Some would 
call this recasting of emancipatory possibilities transformative.
Note how different this politics of uncertainty is from the politics of the techno- 
managerial elites deploying concepts like ‘uncertainty’ for instrumental advantage, 
or the politics of international corporations who see uncertainty as blind- eye vola-
tility for capitalist growth, or a conservative politics permanently sceptical of any-
thing like implementing remedies. In the next section, I explore an example of how 
recasting and transformation can work.
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Recasting global climate change locally
Let us assume the situation is one of ‘too little/ too late’ with respect to ameliorating 
global climate change in global ways. I do this not because I  insist it to be true; 
rather, let us assume this is the worst- case scenario and see if we can, nevertheless, 
recast it in ways that make it more tractable to positive intervention. If we can recast 
a worst case by appealing to the distinctions in the pathway of control, management 
and coping- ahead just discussed, then other scenarios are opened to recasting as 
well in the face of the very real global climate change now underway.
There are many ways in which the Table  5.2 pathway can be used to recast 
the too- little/ too- late worst- case scenario without denying any of its urgency or 
validity. Time and space allow for just one illustration. Let us take as our point of 
departure a recent major review of the published research on the impacts of climate 
change (Mora et al. 2018). Here is what the review article concludes in its main text:
Our assessment of the literature yielded a small number of positive and neu-
tral responses of human systems to climate hazard exposure (reviewed in 
Supplementary Note 2). We surmise that the reduced number of positive or 
neutral impacts may be real, but may also reflect a research bias towards the 
study of detrimental impacts (discussed under Caveats in the Methods). This 
small set of positive and neutral impacts, however, cannot counter- balance 
any of the many detrimental impacts that were uncovered in our literature 
search, particularly when many of these impacts are related to the loss of 
human lives, basic supplies such as food and water, and undesired states for 
human welfare such as access to jobs, revenue and security.
Let us go now to the article’s Caveats subsection for details:
Although our survey of the literature yielded some case examples of 
adaptations, positive and differential impacts (Supplementary Note 2), these 
are unlikely to reflect the full scope of the adaptations, opportunities and 
trade- offs associated with climate hazards. The large array of cases that we 
uncovered with a systematic literature search on only climatic impacts 
suggests that a better understanding of those issues (adaptations, positive and 
differential impacts) will require their own comprehensive analyses.
If the reader’s curiosity is piqued, they will turn to Supplementary Note 2, where 
the following passage is found. (Because this passage is long, the temptation will 
be to skim it. However, the following recasting depends on the reader giving close 
attention to the examples.)
Although the majority of reported impacts were deleterious to humanity, 
some climate hazards led to beneficial impacts and in other cases no observ-





attributed to loss of mosquito breeding habitats brought about by drought 
and habitat loss. Drought and storms occasionally increased nutrient content 
in surviving crops, whereas drought in neighboring countries increased avail-
ability of game animals in Namibia. Drought and natural land cover change 
were in some cases reported to improve water quality due to decreased 
nutrient runoff into streams. Warming reduced seasonal affective disorders, 
and mortality during winters, although the latter is controversial and unlikely 
to outnumber increases in heat- related mortality. Flood exposure increased 
social trust, and the likelihood of people to vote. Changes in ocean chem-
istry altered the distribution of marine organisms increasing availability in 
certain fisheries. Warmer temperatures have increased tourism flow toward 
colder destinations in the UK and the Alps. The Alaskan whale watching 
industry benefited from changes in ocean chemistry leading to changes in 
whale migration patterns, allowing for longer viewing seasons. Since the 
1970s, there has been significant sea ice reduction in the Arctic providing 
increasingly navigable waters and shortening the shipping distances between 
ports. There were also cases where changes in climate hazards did not result 
in observable responses. For instance, societal impacts of floods and storms 
have not been found to contribute to the onset of civil conflict as changes in 
other hazards have. [For ease of reading, text footnotes to each finding have 
been deleted.]
A close reading of all the passages quoted uncovers a narrative discrepancy in Mora 
et al. – and we know from policy analysis that such textual discrepancies can be 
the window through which we can re- see a problem differently (Roe 1994). In my 
re- reading: how did the ‘large array of cases that we uncovered’ referenced in the 
Caveat and itemised in detail in Supplementary Note 2 become in the main text 
‘[t] he small set of positive and neutral impacts’ that ‘cannot counter- balance any of 
the many detrimental impacts that were uncovered in our literature search’ (my 
italics)?
So put, the question brings into focus the local in ways occluded by the term 
global. The first time you read through the list in Supplementary Note 2, what 
is itemised might look more like classic coping strategies (e.g., drought- induced 
hunger leaving people no choice but to do something). But now consider the list 
when seen through the lens of the more granular differentiation of operational 
strategies in Table 5.2. Many of the listed examples begin to look like opportun-
ities for coping- ahead and managing at the local level at which the responses were 
observed.
I do not know if the latter is true and I would be the first to agree with the 
authors that more research is needed on the topic of local positive or neutral 
responses to global climate change. But therein lies the recasting. An uncontrollable 
climate change globally exhibits a ‘large array’ of local coping and managing options 
currently under- researched or acknowledged, which admittedly would constitute a 
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‘small set’ of positive or neutral responses globally. In this recasting, what is ‘too little, 
too late’ at the global level remains open with respect to how late and how little 
this is across a large array of local sites. What better demonstration of a politics of 
uncertainty?
Note, finally, that the urgency and validity of the worst- case scenario remain, 
with local particularity persisting in new forms catalysed by global climate change. 
Am I implying then that global climate change turns out to be a ‘good thing’? No. 
Am I saying that the Mora et al. article is representative of climate change meta- 
analyses? No. Am I saying that all recasting is transformative at the local level? No. 
What I am saying is that the truth of the matter can be pushed further precisely 
because global climate change is complex, locally. Recasting is possible because of, 
not in spite of, the complexity. Further, a large array of local cases could form a 
distribution across which practices may be emerging for local transformations and 
emancipations (the plural is deliberate).
Conclusion
If the above is roughly on- point, the worst enemy of a politics of uncertainty is that 
assumption – shared by the right and the left – that ‘management is control and 
control is power’.
Management is not control, and control is not the only power. Indeed, the 
power of power lies in acting on the fact that illusions of control have to be replaced 
by better notions of managing and coping- ahead in a world of multiple shocks, 
surprises and contingencies. Reverting to formal terms one last time, the desider-
atum of a politics of uncertainty is more about increasing process variance in terms 
of options and strategies than it is about ‘controlling for’ input and output variance. 
(In this way, think of sustainable development as increasing human opportunities 
to respond to unpredictable change without killing ourselves and others in the 
process.)
Nor do we do have to invent a politics of uncertainty. In a planet of seven 
billion- plus people, with over 190 nations, it must be assumed practices already exist 
that evince such sensitivities to different types of unpredictabilities or incertitudes, 
along with different strategies with which to address them more effectively. What 
can the rest of us learn from these practices and across other scales than global?
Some readers may find the preceding to fall well short of social transformation 
and human emancipation. That may be true as far as it goes, but it does not go 
far enough. Only when we differentiate terms like transformation and emanci-
pation across scales of analysis and action is the matter necessarily pushed further. 
And those wider truths? Just as an emancipatory politics of uncertainty recognises 
that uncertainty and unknown- unknowns cannot be closed down to measurable 
risk, so too do those politics require better differentiation among controlling, man-
aging and coping with those risks, uncertainties and the unknown- unknown of 
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